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Mills: Clarifying the Test for Design Defects in South Carolina
CLARIFYING THE TEST FOR DESIGN DEFECTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

I.

INTRODUCTION

Products liability jurisprudence in South Carolina stands in a confused state,
devoid of a clear standard of liability for defective product designs that cause
injuries to consumers. This lack of clarity as to the applicable liability test stems
from two apparently contradictory rulings by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
In 1978, the court announced the "consumer expectations" test as the proper1
liability standard for products liability actions premised on defective designs.
However, in 1982 the court stated that liability for defective product designs
depends on a risk-utility balancing. 2 The court applied this risk-utility test
without disturbing its previous holding that the expectations of the ordinary
consumer control liability. Due to these inconsistent and ambiguous judicial
declarations, the proper interaction between the two liability standards remains
an open question in South Carolina.
This Comment explores how the evolution of design defect liability
nationwide and its parallel development in South Carolina has resulted in a
confounded liability standard. Part II traces the national development of products
liability law and the establishment of various standards of liability. Part III
outlines South Carolina's products liability law, beginning with the statutory
backdrop and continuing with an analysis of cases discussing the tests for design
defect liability. Part Il presents the South Carolina Supreme Court's two
inconsistent statements of design defect liability in conjunction with a number of
subsequent state and federal cases that struggle to define the test for design
defect liability. Part IV attempts to reconcile the contrary holdings to provide a
workable standard of liability that is consistent with the statutory language courts
are bound to apply.
II.

NATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

OF THE LIABILITY STANDARD

FOR DESIGN

DEFECTS

A.

The Consumer Expectations Test

Products liability was born in 1963 when Justice Traynor handed down the
landmark decision of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,3 a case in which
the California Supreme Court unanimously applied strict liability to a
manufacturer despite the lack of an express warranty. 4 This was the first
application of strict liability in tort for defective products. A mere two years

1. See Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
2.
Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982).
3.
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (in bank).
4.
Id. at 900-02.
5.
See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.2, at 263-64 (2d ed. 2008).
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later, the American Law Institute (ALI) promulgated section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement Second), which sets forth a single
test of liability for defective products. 6 Regardless of the nature of the alleged
product defect, section 402A premises liability on a finding that the product was
sold in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or
to his property." 7 While section 402A gained widespread prominence throughout
the country, 8 products liability law was still in its infancy and courts had yet to
flesh out the many facets of an appropriate liability standard. Over time courts
began to realize that there are three recurring types of product defects: defects in
the manufacturing process, defects in the design of a product, and defects in the
warnings and instructions attached to a product. 9 Each type of defect raises
unique concerns, and it is now an accepted tenet of products liability
jurisprudence that each type of defect implicates a different set of legal
obligations and liability tests. 10 While a uniform standard of liability for
defective products seemed appropriate at the time of the promulgation of section
402A, decades of jurisprudence have revealed that a fluid approach-able to
accommodate the varying considerations of each recurring type of product
defect-is necessary.11
The consumer expectations test finds its origins in section 402A's statement
that liability for all product defects rests on a finding that the product was sold
"in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property." 12 Two separate comments to this section explain what it means for
a product to be in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." A defective
condition is "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him." 13 A product is unreasonably dangerous
when it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer." 14 Some courts have interpreted these comments as
establishing a two-pronged standard of liability where satisfaction of either
prong would establish liability, with comment g's definition of defective
condition serving as one prong and comment i's definition of unreasonably

6.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
7. Id.
8.
See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 744-75 (discussing nationwide reaction to § 402A).
9. OWEN, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 344-45.
10. Id.The ALI recognized this tripartite construction of products liability in § 2 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, the successor to § 402A. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998); infra Part Il.D.
11. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (creating liability for the sale of
defective products "unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property"), with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 2 (enumerating specific liability standards for

"manufacturing defect[s]," "defect[s] in design," and defects "because of inadequate instructions or
warnings").
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
13. Id.§ 402A cmt. g.
14. Id.§ 402A cmt. i.
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dangerous as the other prong. 15 However, a majority of courts have found that
the use of such similar language in these comments indicates a single liability
standard premised upon a finding that the dangers which inhere in a product's
design are of the sort that the ordinary consumer would not expect of such a
product. 16
One of the most common criticisms of the consumer expectations test is that
it absolves manufacturers of liability from obvious product dangers. 17 Under the
terms of this test a manufacturer would not be liable for an obvious danger in the
product's design because an obvious danger is necessarily within the
contemplation of an ordinary consumer. This creates a perverse incentive for
manufacturers: the manufacturer can escape liability no matter how likely or
harmful a product danger might be so long as the danger would be obvious to an
ordinary consumer. Because liability might not attach in a situation where the
manufacturer could easily and cost-effectively remove the open and obvious
danger there is no incentive to take seemingly reasonable steps in perfecting the
2
design of products. 19 Such an issue arose in Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 0
where the court denied the plaintiff recovery for the death of her three-year-old
daughter in a fire that the decedent's twin sister started using one of the
defendant's lighters. 21 The plaintiff did not satisfy the consumer expectations test
because the product performed exactly as expected: the lighter produced a flame
when a consumer pulled the trigger. 22 Though the court in Calles also engaged in
a risk-utility analysis, 23 in jurisdictions where the consumer expectations test is
the sole basis of liability, a court could deny a parent recovery in this situation
without any consideration of whether
there was a simple precaution that the
24
manufacturer should have taken.

15. OWEN, supra note 5, § 5.3, at 269; see, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849
F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1988) (imposing liability where the product sold was "in a defective
condition or unreasonably dangerous" (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. §29-28-105 (2000))).
16. OWEN, supra note 5, § 8.3, at 503.
17. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of
Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1236 (1993) ("[I]f the product contains a defect which is
apparent or obvious, the consumer's expectations arguably include the apparent danger, preventing
liability and therefore discouraging product improvements which could easily and cost-effectively

alleviate the danger.").
18. See OWEN, supra note 5, § 5.6, at 306.
19. See id. § 8.3, at 506.
20. 864 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 2007).
21. Id. at 252-53. This case also presented the issue of whether an adult consumer's
expectations should control the inquiry under the consumer expectations test. If the court had based
its decision on the expectations of a minor child, then perhaps the plaintiff could have recovered.
See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
22. Calles, 864 N.E. 2d at 257.
23. Id. at 257-63.
24. After applying the risk-utility test to the facts, the Calles court found for the defendant,
holding that reasonable minds could differ on whether the lighter was unreasonably dangerous. Id.
at 263.
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Another major criticism leveled against the consumer expectations test
involves its relation to complex product designs. Advances in technology have
made increasingly elaborate products available to consumers in their everyday
lives. As product designs increase in complexity, it becomes less likely that the
ordinary consumer will understand the inner workings of such products in a
manner that allows the consumer to expect dangers that may result from the use
of that product. 26 Thus, application of a liability standard based on consumers'
expectations about many complex products which cause harm would result in no
design defect liability for the products' manufacturers because the ordinary
consumer may have no expectations at all in regard to the safety of such
products .27
A final problem with the consumer expectations test involves the question of
whose expectations control the inquiry. In many cases the person harmed by a
product is not the individual who purchased the product, and a question arises
28 as
to whether the expectations of the victim or the29purchaser should control.
h
1 For
f
example, in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., the court denied the plaintiff
mother recovery for the death of her three-year-old son who shot himself while
playing with his father's handgun. 30 Maryland's products liability law is
governed by section 402A of the Restatement Second.31 Using section 402A as
the basis for its decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the
plaintiff could not hold the manufacturer liable because the gun functioned
exactly as an ordinary consumer of the product, such as the infant's father,
would have expected. The court also found that it would be inappropriate to
apply a risk-utility analysis to the decision not to include a safety feature in the
design because the consumer expectations test was the sole test of liability in
design defect cases. 33 This case also demonstrates the concern discussed above
regarding obvious dangers. Assuming that the manufacturer could have cost-

25. See OWEN, supra note 5, § 5.6, at 309.
26. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (quoting John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 829 (1973))
(recognizing that there are many products about which consumers may not have safety
expectations).
27. E.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 310 (Cal. 1994) (holding the consumer
expectations test inappropriate to determine the reasonableness of the design of a vehicle in which
the passenger compartment collapsed on the feet of driver in a head-on collision); see Gary T.
Schwartz, Foreword: UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435,480 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 17 ("[B]ystanders, who are widely recognized by both tort
and contract theories of products liability regardless of privity, cannot be said to have any
expectations about a product which causes them injury." (footnote call number omitted)).
29. 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002).
30. Id. at 1147-48.
31. Products liability law in South Carolina is also governed by § 402A. See infra Part M.
However, Maryland adopted § 402A judicially, whereas South Carolina adopted this test statutorily.
See Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1150; Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1975); infra
notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
32. Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1158.
33. Id. at 1158-59.
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effectively added a safety feature to this firearm to prevent its operation by
toddlers, the consumer expectations test would not command such an addition to
the design because it is the purchaser of the firearm whose expectations govern
the analysis.34 To an adult purchaser, the danger that people might shoot
themselves while handling a gun is obvious; therefore, the test does not require
the manufacturer to adapt the design to protect against use by children, even if it
could be done at relatively no cost.
B. The Risk-Utility Test
The problems involved in applying the consumer expectations test to
product designs led many courts to reconsider the appropriate basis of liability.
From the mid-1970s to the recent adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability (Restatement Third), the risk-utility test has gained
prominence as the measure of liability. 35 As products liability litigation spread
across the nation, it became clear that the consumer expectations test was
inappropriate outside of the manufacturing defect setting 36 and that the flexible
environment of competing considerations in which design decisions are made
requires a more thorough analysis. 37 The risk-utility test is now the standard of
liability in a majority of jurisdictions. 38 This test deems a product defective if a
particular risk of harm outweighs the burden of avoiding the risk. 39 A court must
consider the likelihood that a particular danger will manifest itself and the
probable magnitude of that ensuing harm against the added expense in the
product's manufacturing process and any loss of utility in the product's design
4
that would result from adopting a design that avoids the particular risk of harm. 0
This standard is essentially an application of Judge Learned Hand's well-known
"calculus of risk" principles of negligence liability to the arena of defective

34.

See OWEN, supra note 5, § 5.6, at 307-08.

35.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998).

36. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1516 (1992) ('qn contrast to
manufacturing defects, design and warning defects require more flexible definitions."); cf.David G.
Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 427, 467-68 (1993) (explaining the appropriateness of the consumer expectations
test to manufacturing defect cases).
37. See Owen, supra note 8, at 755 ("[T]he interrelated concepts of reasonableness,
optimality, and balance on which design decisions necessarily rest are captured flawlessly by the
flexible negligence concept."); see generally OWEN, supra note 5, chs. 5 & 8 (detailing the
evolution of liability tests for design defects).
38. See FRUMER, FRIEDMAN & SKLAREN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.03[4] (2009) ("A riskutility analysis has become the exclusive test or an alternative test for strict liability design defect in
most jurisdictions."); Aaron D. Twerski et al., Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From
Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347, 355 (1980) (noting an "overwhelming"
consensus in favor of the risk-utility test for design defects).
39. See OWEN, supra note 5, § 5.7, at 313.
40. Id.
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product designs. The negligence basis for the risk-utility test has led courts in
many jurisdictions to declare that liability under strict liability and negligence
42
causes of action for design defects require the same showing by the plaintiff.
In Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co.,43 the Michigan Supreme Court
presented a number of strong arguments in favor of applying risk-utility
balancing when assessing product designs. First, the court reasoned that design
defects are the result of "deliberate and documentable decisions on the part of
manufacturers" and discovery should provide plaintiffs with ample opportunity
to consider the decision making processes of defendant manufacturers." Once
plaintiffs acquire such information, according to the court, they may utilize
experts to make the case that a manufacturer did not act reasonably in designing
its product. 45 Next, the court stated that the risk-utility test is more likely to
accomplish the goal of safer product design.46 This approach rewards
manufacturers who are diligent in the design process: if they have adequately
weighed the competing design considerations then liability will not attach even if
the product's design does ultimately cause harm. A fault-based risk-utility
standard provides an incentive for manufacturers to carefully design their
products to avoid liability and punishes those manufacturers who are derelict in
this duty. The court also stated that because a finding of a design defect

41. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984) ("The risk-utility balancing test is
merely a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus."). For a discussion of how
to apply the Hand Formula in design defect terms, see OWEN, supra,note 5, § 5.7, at 314.
42. See, e.g., Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 467, 469 (Ga. 1999)
(stating that "the mandate that a product's risk must be weighed against its utility incorporates the
concept of 'reasonableness,' so as to apply negligence principles in the determination of whether the
manufacturer defectively designed its product" and thus holding that the lower court should not
have employed negligence principles separately from the risk-utility analysis); see also Leon
Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Thx. L. REV.
1185, 1205 (1977) (arguing that both courts and the comments to § 402A of the Restatement Second
suggest a negligence-based test for design defects); Aaron D. Twerski, Chasing the Illusory Pot of
Gold at the End of the Rainbow: Negligence and Strict Liability in Design Defect Litigation, 90
MARQ. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006) ("If risk-utility tradeoffs are to be utilized to decide whether a design is
defective, then there is no difference between negligence and strict liability."). But see Blue v.
Envtl. Eng'g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1141-42 (Ill. 2005) (holding that it was inappropriate to use
strict liability risk-utility analysis in a negligence cause of action for a design defect because under
negligence the focus is on the conduct of the manufacturer, while under strict liability the focus is
on the product itself).
43. 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984).
44. Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 185. This is in contrast to the context of manufacturing defects,
which are the result of an error in the production process rather than in the design of the product
itself. Strict liability is appropriate in the manufacturing defect context because it may be
impractical or impossible for the plaintiff to prove the occurrence of a specific production error that
led to harm. See OWEN, supra note 5, § 7.2, at 456. However, in the case of design defects, the
factors considered in the design process are sufficiently accessible to allow for a fault-based
standard or liability without jeopardizing plaintiffs' rights.
45. Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 185.
46. Id.
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implicates an entire product line, plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate a
higher threshold of fault before a court judgment affects such a large portion of
the defendant's assets and potentially deprives the public of the ability to
purchase a particular product.47 Finally, according to the court, the risk-utility
standard offers "greater intrinsic fairness" because it will not require a safetyconscious manufacturer to bear the burden of harms caused by the negligence of
others.4 8 As a result, diligent manufacturers will also benefit from being able to
offer lower prices than their less-safety-conscious competitors.
The risk-utility test provides an answer to the problems 49 inherent in the
consumer expectations test. First, a risk-utility balancing would likely not deny
recovery for a product-related injury merely because the danger was obvious to
the consumer. The obviousness of the danger becomes one factor for the court to
consider in assessing the overall utility of the product. An obvious danger may
weigh against a plaintiffs recovery if the plaintiff is the most effective risk
minimizer, 51 but in many situations the risk balance will indicate that the
manufacturer could have cost-effectively removed an obvious risk.
Second, the risk-utility test has an advantage over the consumer
expectations test in that it offers a workable liability standard to apply to
complex products about which consumer expectations are vague or nonexistent.
For such products, use of the risk-utility standard allows for the presentation of
expert testimony to inform jurors of the nature of products about which they
could not otherwise make a safety determination. Consideration of expert
testimony grants the jury a reasonable basis from which to evaluate the
manufacturer's culpability for an allegedly defective design. This allows the jury
to reach the issue at the heart of a design defect case-whether or not the design
was sufficiently safe for society to be willing to countenance the manufacturer's
decision to market and sell the product-without the artificial focus on the
consumer's prospective harm,
which risks obscuring the true issue of the
53
manufacturer's culpability.
Finally, favoring a risk calculus approach over the consumer expectations
test easily resolves the sometimes difficult question of whose expectations
should control the inquiry in cases where the injured party is not the purchaser or
consumer of the product. Under a risk-utility balancing, the court considers all
of the potential dangers inherent in a product, including those to bystanders and

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
50. See Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231, 241 (5th Cir. 2003).
51. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 1517.
52. For a discussion of the role played by technological experts in products liability litigation,
see William A. Donaher et al., The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEX.
L. REV. 1303 (1974).
53. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 810 (Or. 1967) (affirming the
dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action because there was no evidence of consumer expectations
regarding the breaking point of a truck wheel).
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third-party users. 54 When the focus is on the reasonableness of the product itself,
there is less danger that courts will deny injured parties compensation for harms
for which the manufacturer is responsible because of its failure to adequately
consider the safety of foreseeable plaintiffs other than the purchaser or an
ordinary consumer.
C. Combining the Consumer Expectations and Risk-Utility Tests
Section 402A of the Restatement Second served as the foundation of liability
for defective products in most states, either through judicial or statutory
adoption, 55 and thus it often bound courts to apply the consumer expectations
test embodied in the comments to section 402A even as they began to realize that
the risk-utility test might serve as a more suitable basis for liability. 56 As a
result, courts created a number of approaches to synthesize the two tests or at
least acknowledge the existence of both.
1.

Two IndependentBases of Liability

In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 57 the California Supreme Court
established a theory of design defect liability that allowed for recovery under
either the risk-utility or consumer expectations test. 58 The plaintiff in this case
was operating a high-lift loader at a construction site. 59 When the load of lumber
on the lift began to shift, he jumped from the loader and was hit and seriously
injured by a piece of the falling lumber. 6° The trial court rendered a judgment for
the defendant, but the California Supreme Court remanded the case due to error
in the trial court's instruction that based strict liability for a defect in the design
of a product on a finding that the product was "unreasonably dangerous for its
intended use.'61 This instruction was contrary to the court's prior holdings
criticizing the "unreasonably dangerous" language from section 402A, 62 and the
63
court took the opportunity to set forth a new standard for design defect liability.
The court criticized the consumer expectations test for establishing a
"ceiling" on a manufacturer's liability rather than a "floor." 64 In other words, the
court reasoned that all products must meet an ordinary consumer's expectations

54. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 495.
55 See Owen, supra note 8, at 744.
56. See, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997) (using
the consumer expectations test but incorporating aspects of the risk-utility test).
57. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
58. Id. at 446.
59. Id. at 445.
60. Id. at 447.
61. Id. at449-52.
62. Id. at 451 (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62 (1972)).
63. See id. at 449-57.
64. Id. at 451 n.7.
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to be deemed nondefective but that such a finding did not end the inquiry;
liability could still attach under the risk-utility test.65 The court held that:
a product is defective in design either (1) if the product has failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in light of the
relevant factors ....the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the
66
risk of danger inherent in such design.
The court placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that a product
failed to conform to the expectations of the ordinary consumer; however, once
the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the product's design caused the
harm, the court stated that the burden of proof for the risk-utility prong of the
test shifts to the defendant to prove that the product was not defective. 6 7 In
determining that this two-pronged approach was an appropriate measure of
liability, the court noted one of the aforementioned problems with the consumer
expectations test: in evaluating many product designs, "the consumer would not
know what68to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could
be made.,
2.

Different Tests for Complex and Simple Designs

Still struggling with the increasing recognition that in many cases the riskutility test is a more suitable standard of liability than the consumer expectations
test, in 1994 the California Supreme Court expressly held that the consumer
expectations test is only applicable to simple designs while the risk-utility test is
appropriate for complex designs about which the consumer's expectations are
vague. 69 Numerous courts throughout the nation follow this approach. 70 In Soule
v. General Motors, the plaintiff suffered two broken ankles when, following a
collision with another vehicle, the left front wheel of her vehicle broke free and
smashed the floorboard inward. 71 The plaintiff premised her claim not on the

65. See id. at 454.
66. Id. at 446.
67. Id. at 455.
68. Id. at 454 (quoting Wade, supra note 26, at 829) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
69. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298,308 (Cal. 1994).
70. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. 1985) (using the consumer
expectations test for products which a consumer may form expectations about and the risk-utility
test for products which a consumer may not form expectations about); Camacho v. Honda Motor
Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246-47 (Colo. 1987) (noting that the consumer expectations test is
inappropriate for some complex products because manufacturers "have greater access than do
ordinary consumers to the information necessary to reach informed decisions concerning the
efficacy of potential safety measures" (citing Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An
Analytical Framework, 62 N.C. L. REV. 643, 675 (1984))); Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 533
(Tenn. 1996) (using both the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test).
71. Soule, 882 P.2d at 301.
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72
cause of the accident itself, but rather on the crashworthiness of the vehicle.
According to the plaintiff, the defendant's design was defective for failing to
73
adequately protect against the foreseeable injuries of motor vehicle accidents.
She alleged that the placement of a bracket and the configuration of the frame of
the vehicle failed to adequately restrict the rearward travel of the wheel in an
accident and thus exacerbated the injuries that she would have otherwise
suffered.74 The trial court gave the standard California design defect jury
instruction, which was based on the two-pronged Barker test discussed above.
The issue before the California Supreme Court was the defendant's contention
that it was inappropriate to instruct the jury on the consumer expectations prong
of liability and that in this case, the jury should have considered only the riskutility test.76
The court began its analysis by noting that there are some cases in which the
"purposes, behaviors, and dangers of certain products are commonly understood
by those who ordinarily use them." 77 In such cases, no proof beyond the
expectations of ordinary consumers is required to prove liability, and the
manufacturer is not entitled to defend the claim by presenting evidence of the
design's risks and benefits. 78 On the other hand, there are cases in which "a
complex product ... may often cause injury in a way that does not engage its
ordinary
consumers'
reasonable minimum assumptions about safe
performance." 79 In such complex product cases, "the jury must consider the
manufacturer's evidence of competing design considerations," and the consumer
expectations test is an inappropriate basis for liability. 80 Where ordinary
consumers lack expectations about a product's operation under certain
conditions, "the ultimate issue of design defect calls for a careful assessment of
feasibility, practicality, risk, and benefit. 81 The fact that Soule was a complex
design case requiring experts in biomechanics, metallurgy, orthopedics, design
engineering, and crash-test simulation to frame the issue supports the court's
unwillingness to apply the consumer expectations test. 82 Indeed, because the
determination of design defect in this case was a matter of "technical and
mechanical detail" and the jury had to consider the "precise behavior of several

72. Id. at 303.
73. Id.
74. Id.at 302.
75. Id.at 303; see discussion supra Part III.C.1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 307.
78. Id. at 308 ("As we have seen, the consumer expectations test
which the everyday experience of the product's users permits a conclusion
violated minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of
merits of the design.").
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456-57 (Cal.
81. Id.at305.
82. See id. at 302.
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obscure components of [the plaintiff s] car under the complex circumstances of a
particular accident," the instruction on the consumer expectations test was not
appropriate for this case; instead, the court should have limited the jury to a
consideration of risk-utility. 83 However, because the court found it highly
unlikely that the jury relied on the consumer expectations test to the 84exclusion of
the risk-utility test, the court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.
3.

Defining Consumer Expectations in Risk-Utility Terms

A number of courts have attempted to blend the consumer expectations and
risk-utility tests into a single test of liability. For example, in 1997, the
Connecticut Supreme Court declared a test for design defectiveness in Potter v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. that framed the consumer expectations test
explicitly in risk-utility terms. 86 Although adhering to its "long-standing rule
that a product's defectiveness is to be determined by the expectations of an
ordinary consumer," the court announced a hybrid test. 87 Specifically, a
"modified consumer expectation test provides the jury with the product's risks
and utility and then inquires whether a reasonable consumer would consider the
product unreasonably dangerous. ' 88 Factors which the trier of fact may consider
in the analysis of a product's risk and utility include
the usefulness of the product, the likelihood and severity of the danger
posed by the design, the feasibility of an alternative design, the financial
cost of an improved design, the ability to reduce the product's danger
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive, and
the
89
feasibility of spreading the loss by increasing the product's price.
In other words, under this test the trier of fact views consumer expectations in
light of the above factors and then asks whether a reasonable consumer would
view the product as unreasonably dangerous. Thus, the liability inquiry applied
in this case purports to rest on consumer expectations, but it is the risk calculus
that is ultimately dispositive.
Although the Potter court was wary of backing away from the section 402A
formulation of products liability, it did recognize the propriety of the risk-utility
approach. Unfortunately, the result is an awkward attempt to fit the different
standards into a single measure of liability that merely pays lip service to the

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 310.
Id. at311.
694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
Id. at 1333.

87.

Id.

88. Id.; accord Vautuor v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182 (N.H. 2001)
(stating that whether a product is dangerous beyond a consumer's expectations is "determined by
the injury using a risk-utility balancing test").
89. Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333-34.
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expectations of consumers without offering a meaningful definition that
comports with the reality of the consuming public. Consumers do not expect to
have to weigh the risks and utilities inherent in a product, yet this is precisely
what the Potter test asks them to do. While this may be a convenient way to
adapt products liability jurisprudence to the growing acceptance of the
superiority of the risk calculus, it is doubtful that any ordinary understanding of
"consumer expectations" would suggest that it is the responsibility of the
consumer to weigh the risks presented by a product's design. Instead, the
manufacturer's design experts should perform this balance.
In melding the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests, the Potter court
cited Seattle-FirstNational Bank v. Tabert9° and its pronouncement that "[i]n
determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of
factors must be considered."9 These factors include "[t]he relative cost of the
product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost
and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk., 9 2 The Tabert court
similarly failed to adequately explain what role the risk-utility factors play in
assessing the expectations of consumers. How exactly consideration of these
factors informs the consumer's expectations is unclear.
The Oregon Supreme Court offered a more direct approach to melding the
two tests in 1974 in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co. 93 The court stated that the
test of liability is "whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article
knowing of the risk involved." 94 This focus on negligence incorporates the riskutility test into the evaluation of a product because it is the traditional measure of
negligence. 95 The court then stated that its proposed test is actually no different
than the test embodied in the reference to consumer contemplations located in
comment i of section 402A of the Restatement Second because it viewed the
"seller-oriented standard and [the] user-oriented standard" as "two sides of the
same standard. '' 96 This is true because "a manufacturer who would be negligent
in marketing a given product, considering its risks, would necessarily be
marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers
who purchase it." 97 This standard does an admirable job of providing a solid

90. 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975); see Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333.
91. Tabert, 542 P.2d at 779.
92. Id.
93. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
94. Id. at 1036 (emphasis omitted). This is actually a risk-utility test stripped of the element
of scienter. Commentators have referred to such a test, which originated in law review articles
authored separately by Dean Wade and Dean Keeton, as the Wade-Keeton "prudent manufacturer"
or "constructive knowledge" test. See generally OwEN, supra note 5, § 8.7 (discussing the WadeKeeton test).
95. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (using a riskutility test to measure negligence).
96. Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254
(5th Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 1037.
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grounding for the consumer expectations test because the ordinary consumer
expects the manufacturer to perform a risk-utility balancing before placing a
product on the market for sale. However, the Phillips holding ultimately
disappoints because it allows for the consideration of unforeseeable product
risks, imposing too harsh a standard on product manufacturers. 98 Regardless, the
court's astute suggestion that consumers have expectations as to the behavior of
manufacturers should not be ignored.
D. The Restatement Third's Requirement of a Reasonable Alternative
Design
Realizing that the time had come to expressly address many of the trends
revealed by the national development of products liability, in 1998 the ALI
promulgated a new restatement dedicated entirely to the subject of products
liability. 99 The liability standard contained therein offered a drastic revision to
the single liability test embodied in section 402A. 1°° Section 2 of the
Restatement Third expressly addresses the three types of product defects and
provides a unique liability test for each.10 1 A product is defective in design only
if it is shown that "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design...
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe." 10 2 Despite this "functional" definition of liability, the comments to this
section make clear that liability for design and warning defects is "predicated on
negligence," while liability for manufacturing defects remains strict. 103 The
comments also expressly state that a "'risk - utility' balancing is necessary" for
design defects. 1°4 This most recent summary of the law by the ALl recognizes
many of the considerations discussed above which have pushed courts away
from liability premised on consumer expectations and toward the more robust
risk-utility standard. Section 402A serves as a model for products liability
throughout the nation; however, the Restatement Third recognizes that a more
robust standard has blossomed from section 402A's simple beginning.

98. See id. at 1036.
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). For a discussion of the
evolution and adoption of the Restatement Third, see OWEN, supra note 5, § 6.5.
100. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (imposing a single liability
test based on a finding that the product was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous),
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (delineating three separate tests

depending on the nature of the product defect).
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2.

102. Id. § 2(b).
103. Id. § 2 cmt. a; see also Twerski, supra note 42 (explaining that the functional test for
design defects embodied in § 2(b) of the Restatement Third is really an expression of traditional
negligence principles).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 9
1114

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60: 1101

Il1. DESIGN DEFECT LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A.

South Carolina'sProductsLiability Statute

Since its enactment in 1974, section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code
has governed products liability law in South Carolina. This provision represents
a legislative adoption of section 402A of the Restatement Second.10 5 The
legislature expressly incorporated the comments to section 402A into the
legislative history of the products liability chapter of the South Carolina Code. 106
Thus, liability for a product defect in South Carolina attaches upon a finding that
the product was sold "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property."' 107 As previously discussed, the AL defined
both "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" in terms that impose
. 108
liability where a product's dangers exceed consumer safety expectations.
Incorporation of these definitions from the Restatement Second into the
legislative history of section 15-73-10 indicates that the "consumer expectations
test" facially applies in South Carolina. Although the single liability standard of
section 402A statutorily governs all product defects in South Carolina, the
developed jurisprudence nationwide has shown that practical considerations
mandate the recognition of the unique aspects of each type of product defect. 109
This Part explores the relevance of these developments with regard to liability
for defective product designs in South Carolina.10
B. Design Defect Case Law in South Carolina
Design defect case law in South Carolina presents a muddied picture. There
is not a clear line of precedent from the supreme court on the liability standard
for design defects. Still, even though the case law fails to elucidate a single,
cognizable measure of liability, a number of cases supply hints and indications
as to what the proper standard of liability for defective product designs should
be.

105. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (2005) (adopting verbatim the language of § 402A).
106. Id. § 15-73-30 ("Comments to § 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, are
incorporated herein by reference thereto as the legislative intent of this chapter.").
107. Id. § 15-73-10; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1965).
108. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
110. Problems relating to the application of South Carolina's unitary liability standard in the
areas of manufacturing and warning defects are beyond the scope of this work. For a discussion of
these developments on a national level, see OWEN, supra note 5, §§ 5.5, 7.2, 7.3, 9.2, 9.3.
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Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.

In Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.,i the South Carolina Supreme Court
announced the consumer expectations test as the appropriate basis of liability for
defective product designs.
This case involved a wrongful death action arising
out of the death of a boater who became entangled in the lines of the trolling
motor and drowned while hanging over the side of the boat. 113 The plaintiff
contended that the design of the boat in question was defective because it did not
include a kill switch that would have automatically cut power to the motor
at the
114
point when the operator was no longer in a position to control the boat.
The issue in this case was whether the lack of a kill switch "rendered the
boat 'dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics.' 115 This is an explicit statement of the
consumer expectations test applied to design defects. The court's application of
this test also demonstrates that the consumer expectations test was controlling.
Specifically, the court held that it is "common knowledge" that one of the
dangers of boating is being thrown overboard and that such knowledge,
therefore, must be imputed to the decedent. 116 With this danger imputed to the
decedent, the court stated that the added "danger posed by the obvious lack of a
kill switch could hardly be beyond his contemplation."117 Therefore, because the
court decided this case by analyzing the expectations of an ordinary consumer of
the defendant's product, Young provides a clear application of the consumer
expectations test in South Carolina.
2.

Claytor v. General Motors Corp.

Four years after Young, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Claytor
v. General Motors Corp. The plaintiffs in this case were injured when the
wheel separated from a car, causing it to veer into oncoming traffic and strike the
plaintiffs' vehicle.11 9 The alleged defect in the car was a failure to design a
sufficiently strong lu0 bolt to avoid the cracking that purportedly caused the
wheel to come loose.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
(1965)).
116.
117.
118.
119.

270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
Id. at 471, 424 S.E.2d at 680.
Id. at 458, 424 S.E.2d at 673.
Id. at 470-71,424 S.E.2d at 679.
Id. at 471, 424 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i
Id. at 471-72, 424 S.E.2d at 680.
Id. at 472, 424 S.E.2d at 680.
277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982).
Id. at 261, 286 S.E.2d at 130.

120. Id.
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The Claytor court stated that the test for liability for a design defect is
"whether the product is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user given
121
the conditions and circumstances that foreseeably attend use of the product.,
The court's use of the language "unreasonably dangerous" from the products
liability statute commands reference to the legislative incorporation of the
Restatement Second's consumer contemplation definition of this phrase 122 and
does not provide any further guidance as to the appropriate standard of
liability. 123 However, the court also stated that "[i]n the final analysis, we have
another of the law's balancing acts and numerous factors must be considered,
including the usefulness and desirability of the product, the cost involved for
added safety, the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury, and the
obviousness of danger.' ' 124 This language suggests that the risk-utility test plays
some role in the determination of a design defect. Nevertheless, the Claytor
court's statement does not explain how this test can be reconciled with the
consumer expectations test appearing in the legislative history as well as in
Young's holding just four years earlier that the consumer expectations test is
determinative of design defect liability.
Unfortunately, the court's reference to a balancing test is only dictum, as the
court resolved the issues in this case without resorting to the test for design
defectiveness described therein. Because defectiveness under the South Carolina
products liability statute is determined at the time of the sale, 125 a defect which
arises through the actions of a party subsequent to the sale of the product to the
consumer cannot be a basis for the manufacturer's liability. The court ruled that
any defect in the product was caused by third party misuse when a mechanic had
over tightened the lug bolts on the wheel. 12 Given this basis for the court's
decision, its statement of the test for liability is not significantly explicative of
the proper liability standard.
3.

Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.
127

In Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., decided almost a year after Claytor,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated a test of South Carolina design defect
liability that appears to synthesize the risk-utility and consumer expectations

121. Id. at 262, 286 S.E.2d at 131 (citing Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171,
176, 246 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1978)).
122. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10, -30 (2005).
123. See Claytor, 277 S.C. at 262-66, 286 S.E.2d at 131-32.
124. Id. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
125. See § 15-73-10 (2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g
(1965) (providing that the defectiveness of a product is determined "at the time that it left the hands
of the particular seller").
126. Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
127. 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982).
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tests, albeit in an ambiguous fashion.128 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of a
motor home after they were injured
when the motor home burst into flames
following a rear-end collision. 1 9 The primary issue was whether the location of
113
the fuel tank on the motor home rendered the vehicle defective in design. 130
One of the questions before the court in Reed was the admissibility of
evidence of the relevant state of the art in the industry. 131 In assessing whether to
allow such evidence, the court discussed the standard of design defect liability in
South Carolina. 132 The Fourth Circuit explained that the defendant offered the
evidence for the purpose of showing that the design "met reasonable consumer
expectation[s].,133 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that the South Carolina
Supreme Court had held that a design is unreasonably dangerous only if it fails
to include a safety feature that a "consumer might expect."' 134 However, the
Fourth Circuit also noted that the Claytor decision appears to stand for the
proposition that South Carolina courts employ a balancing test to determine the
presence of a design defect. 135
Despite acknowledging the risk-utility test, the Fourth Circuit, like the
South Carolina Supreme Court, failed to explain the interaction between this test
and the consumer expectations test. The court asserted that the balancing test
found its origins in comment i to section 402A. 136 Yet comment i defines the
phrase "unreasonably dangerous" in terms of the contemplations of the ordinary
consumer. 137 While asserting that a balancing test applied, the Reed court stated
that "the comment does require a determination of what consumers expect when
they purchase a particular product" and held that state-of-the-art evidence is
admissible to aid in the framing of an ordinary consumer's expectations. 138 The
court then stated that a "'balancing act' necessarily is relevant to the
determination that the product, as designed, is unreasonably
dangerous in its
,
•
,,139
failure to conform to the ordinary consumer's expectations.
This language
suggests a hierarchy in which the expectations of the consumer ultimately
control, with the risk-utility balance standing as just one factor to consider in
ascertaining these expectations. But there is no clear picture of the liability
standard.

128. Id. at 1197 (citing Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132; Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.,
270 S.C. 453,471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978)).
129. Id. at 1195.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1194.
132. Id. at 1196-97.
133. Id. at 1195.
134. Id. at 1197 (citing Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680
(1978)).
135. See id. at 1196-98 (citing Clayor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d
129, 132 (1982)).
136. Id. at 1197.
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
138. Reed, 697 F.2d at 1197.
139. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Young, 270 S.C. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 680).
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Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc.

In Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc.,14° the South Carolina Court of Appeals
announced an ambiguous test of liability that inadequately distinguished between
the traditional consumer expectations and risk-utility tests of liability. 141 Bragg
involved a products liability suit brought in both negligence and strict liability by
the estate of an employee of an electrical contractor against the manufacturer of
an aerial bucket.
The decedent was engaging in a power line change out
procedure when the bucket supporting him above the power lines caught on fire,
143
forcing him to jump from
He sustained injuries which led to his
144 the bucket.
..
death a few days later. The alleged basis of liability was that the absence of
145 a
safety device in the design of the aerial bucket rendered the product defective.
The court of appeals first determined that it was not inconsistent to grant a
directed verdict on a strict liability claim while submitting a negligence claim to
the jury. 146 The court then proceeded to review the propriety of the trial court's
directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer on the strict liability claim. The
court noted that " [t]wo tests have evolved to determine whether a product is in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous."' 147 The two tests the court
described were the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test. 148 The
language the court of appeals used indicates that use of the risk-utility test is
mandatory in South Carolina. 149 The court then stated, in terms nearly identical
to those the Reed court used, that the "'balancing act' is also relevant to the
determination that the product, as designed, is unreasonably dangerous in its
failure to conform to the ordinary user's expectations."150 This latter statement
indicates a role for the risk-utility test that in one sense is ancillary to the
consumer expectations test. On the one hand, it could be that a determination
that a product fails a risk-utility balancing automatically mandates a finding that
the product lacks conformity with the expectations of the ordinary consumer. On

140. 319 S.C. 531, 462 S.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1995).
141. Id. at 544, 462 S.E.2d at 328 (citing Reed, 697 F.2d at 1197; Claytor v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982)).
142. Id. at 534, 462 S.E.2d at 323.
143. Id. at 535, 462 S.E.2d at 323-24.
144. Id. at 535, 462 S.E.2d at 324.
145. Id. at 536, 462 S.E.2d at 324.
146. Id. at 541, 462 S.E.2d at 327.
147. Id. at 543, 462 S.E.2d at 328 (citing Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347
(5th Cir. 1983)).
148. Id. (citing Carter,716 F.2d at 347; Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 262, 286
S.E.2d 129, 131 (1982)).
149. See id. at 544, 462 S.E.2d at 328 (citing Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132)
("Thus, in South Carolina we balance the utility of the risk inherent in the design of the product
with the magnitude of the risk to determine the reasonableness of the manufacturer's action in
designing the product.").
150. Id. at 544, 462 S.E.2d at 328 (citing Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192,
1197 (4th Cir. 1982); Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132).
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the other hand, it could also be that the weighing of risks and benefits inherent in
a product's design is just one factor to be considered in ascertaining the
expectations of the consumer.
Adding to the confusion engendered by this decision, the court of appeals
agreed with the trial court's findings that the plaintiff failed to present any
evidence that the product was defective at the time it was sold and that the
plaintiff "failed to introduce evidence of a feasible design alternative." 151 The
plain language suggests that these are separate findings, but the court did not
explain why it structured the findings in this manner. If the court intended to
present two separate findings, a question then arises as to the significance of a
finding of a failure to present evidence of an alternative design alongside a
separate finding that the product was not defective when sold. It remains unclear
whether the lack of alternative design proof is a mere factor in assessing
defectiveness or whether this finding conclusively establishes nonliability, as it
is in the Restatement Third.152 In some jurisdictions, the consideration of a
feasible alternative design is the central, required element of the risk-utility
test, 153 whereas other jurisdictions hold that evidence of a feasible alternative
design is admissible but not mandatory in design defect cases. 154 Jurisdictions
adopting the latter approach often treat alternative design evidence as a mere
factor in the risk-utility balancing. 155 Thus, the significance of evidence of a
feasible alternative design in South Carolina products liability cases depends in
large part on unraveling the mystery of the relevance of the risk-utility test in
this state's jurisprudence.
The court's resolution of the strict liability claim in this case also fails to
explain the appropriate interaction between the different standards of liability.
The case turned on a finding of product misuse, foreclosing any need to apply a
test of design defect liability to the facts. 156 As in Claytor,the court's discussion
of the appropriate test for design defect is properly characterized as dictum. The
court found that a mechanic had installed a conductive hose when the mechanic
should have used a nonconductive hose, 157 meaning that the defective condition
arose at a time when the product was out of the defendant's control; thus, the
product was not defective at the time it was sold. 158 A finding that the product

151. Id. at 542, 462 S.E.2d at 327.
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).

153. See OWEN, supra note 5, § 8.5, at 522-23 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482
So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp.,
554 So. 2d 927, 928 (Ala. 1989)).
154. See id. at 523-24.
155. See, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997)
(considering the feasibility of another design as a factor in proving that "a product's risks outweigh
its utility").
156. Bragg, 319 S.C. at 545-46,462 S.E.2d at 329-30.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 545,462 S.E.2d at 329.
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was not defective when it left the defendant's control, however, does not explain
the significance of South Carolina's statutory liability standard.
5.

Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.

In a more recent decision, Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,159
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina found that
South Carolina applies a test of design defect liability that most resembles
section 2(b) of the Restatement Third.16 The widow of a smoker of over thirty
years sued the defendant cigarette manufacturers to recover for her deceased
husband's lung cancer and smoking-related injuries. 161In this decision, the court
addressed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 162
The defendants argued that the court should grant summary judgment on the
negligence and strict liability claims for three reasons: first, because "cigarettes
are not defective as a matter of law"; second, because "cigarettes are not
unreasonably dangerous because the dangers of smoking [had] been commonly
known throughout [decedent's] lifetime"; and third, because the plaintiff failed
to meet her "burden to prove a safer alternative design." 163 Only the latter two of
these issues are relevant for this discussion. 164 In addressing the defendants'
second contention, the court applied what appears to be a pure consumer
expectations test. 165 Specifically, the court framed the issue in terms of whether
the dangers of smoking were "common knowledge" to the ordinary consumer
and noted that such a finding would bar the plaintiff's claim. 166 The court
ultimately left it to the jury to determine whether the dangerous nature of
cigarettes was common knowledge before 1988.167

159. 243 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D.S.C. 2001).
160. Id. at 496 (applying South Carolina law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
161. Little, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 484-85. The claim was initially brought in state court by the
husband, Martin Little. Mr. Little passed away a year after the lawsuit was commenced. Id.

162. Id. at 485.
163. Id. at 489.
164. On the first issue, the court determined that the sentence in comment i to § 402A of the
Restatement Second stating that "[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the
effects of smoking may be harmful," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965), did
not require a finding that cigarettes are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. Little, 243 F.
Supp. 2d at 489-90. As noted above, the legislature incorporated the comments to § 402A into
South Carolina's products liability statute. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
165. Little, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 491-94.
166. Id. at 491-92. The court further stated that "[a] product cannot be labeled either defective
or unreasonably dangerous 'if a danger associated with the product is one that the product's users
generally recognize."' Id. at 491 (quoting Anderson v. Green Bull, Inc., 322 S.C. 268, 271, 471
S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 1996)).
167. Id. at 494. The Surgeon General first published a report detailing the addictive nature of
cigarettes in 1988, and thus the court held that after this date "all the risks associated with cigarette
smoking were known to the ordinary consumer with the ordinary knowledge common to the
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As to the defendants' third argument, that the plaintiff failed to present
evidence of a reasonable alternative design, a dispute arose over whether such
proof is a required element of a products liability action
,,.168 or if it is "instead merely
a factor to be considered in the risk-utility analysis.
The court noted that the
Fourth Circuit had found proof of a safer alternative design to be a "part of the
plaintiff's products liability case under South Carolina law. ' 169 Then, the court
held that despite the indefinite language used by South Carolina courts in
discussing alternative design evidence, "it is clear the South Carolina law
requires that [p]laintiff[s] provide such evidence in order to survive summary
judgment." 170 Because the plaintiff in this case could present evidence of a safer
alternative design, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. 171 Thus, the district court found that South Carolina applies a test
parallel to the dictate of section 2(b) of the Restatement Third-a design is
defective when the "foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
172
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design."
IV. RECONCILING YOUNG AND CLAYTOR:
DESIGN DEFECT LIABILITY

TOWARD A CLEARER STATEMENT OF

With Young and Claytor, the South Carolina Supreme Court sowed the seeds
of considerable confusion surrounding the liability standard for design defects,
especially regarding the interplay between the consumer expectations and riskutility tests. However, these holdings are potentially reconcilable to reveal a
single, cognizable theory of liability. Still, any attempt at reconciliation must
ultimately be grounded in South Carolina's products liability statute. 173 As
previously discussed, this statute is a verbatim adoption of section 402A of the
Restatement Second.174 Therefore, the liability standard of a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous" 175 and the legislatively adopted comments defining this
phrase in terms of an ordinary consumer's expectations govern this attempt at
reconciliation. 176 This Part offers a resolution of the conflicts in South Carolina's
design defect authority that strives to remain true to this legislative backdrop but
be mindful simultaneously of current developments in design defect

community." Id. (citing Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1054 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990)).
168. Id. at 494-95.
169. Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Winnebago Indus., Inc.,
210 F.3d 360, 2000 WL 299459, at *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (applying South
Carolina law)).
170. Id. at 496.
171. Id. at 496-97.
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
173. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10, -30 (2005).
174. See discussion supra Part III.A.
175. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 12-14, 105-06 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence. The goal is to present a structure of design defect law that courts
will be able to apply in a more coherent and consistent manner than has been
possible under the developed case law.
In Young, the South Carolina Supreme Court cited comment i to section
402A in holding that the allegedly defective product must be "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." 177 This decision is entirely consistent with the legislative
adoption of section 402A and its consumer expectations test.178 The confusion
arises with Claytor's pronouncement that in assessing liability under the South
Carolina statute, "we have another of the law's balancing acts and numerous
factors must be considered, including the usefulness and desirability of the
product, the cost involved for added safety, the likelihood and potential
seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger.' 179 This is a liability
standard stated explicitly in risk-utility terms, and the court failed to explain
how such a test might fit within the statutory scheme chosen by South Carolina's
legislators. Indeed, other courts have struggled with deriving the accurate
liability test from these precedents. 18° Thus, it appears difficult to square the
Young and Claytor tests in light of the supreme court's contradictory language
while remaining consistent with the clear language of South Carolina's products
liability statute.
Nevertheless, the South Carolina Supreme Court could set forth a sound
liability standard by following the Potter, Tabert, and Phillips courts' approach
and defining consumer expectations in risk-utility terms.
The Phillips court
provided a helpful step in the right direction with its pronouncement that a
manufacturer is liable for producing a product that fails to meet ordinary
consumer expectations when the manufacturer would be negligent in selling that
product. 182 In other words, the ordinary consumer expects that the manufacturer

177. Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)) (INTERNAL QUOTATION MARKS
OMITTED).

178. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
179. Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982).
180. See Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing
Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132; Young, 270 S.C. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 680); Little v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480, 496 (D.S.C. 2001); Bragg v. Hi-Ranger,
Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 544, 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Reed, 697 F.2d at 1197;
Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132). For a detailed discussion of these three cases, see
supra Part III.B.3-5.
181. See supra Part Il.C.3.
182. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974). The Phillips court is
guilty of a troublesome adoption of the Wade-Keeton "prudent manufacturer" test: it held that a
manufacturer is liable if it would have been negligent for placing the product on the market,
knowing all of its potential risks. Id. This formulation would hold manufacturers liable even for
unforeseeable risks. See OWEN, supra note 5, § 8.7, at 548-51. Courts have rightly rejected this
harsh formulation and even Deans Wade and Keeton, who proposed this standard, have both since
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of a given product will act in a non-negligent manner in offering a product for
sale. Accordingly, this principle provides a clear role for the "factors [which]
must be considered" in assessing the "reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer." 18 3 As previously discussed, Potterand Tabert attempted to merge the
consumer expectations and risk-utility tests, but much like the South Carolina
cases, Potter and Tabert failed to explain ....
adequately how the risk-utility184test is
derived from a statement that liability rests on consumer expectations.
The
Phillips court's recognition that consumers have expectations regarding a
manufacturer's conduct in selecting a product design answers the question of
what the courts are actually evaluating when they
cite risk-utility factors as
• 185
being relevant to assessing consumer expectations:
the ordinary consumer
expects that the manufacturer will weigh the "usefulness and desirability of the
product, the cost involved for added safety, the likelihood and potential
seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger" 18 6 and only offer a product
for sale to the general public if the benefits of the particular design outweigh the
dangers in that product design.187 Such a formulation of the liability standard
may actually be an accurate statement of how the ordinary consumer views
product design. Especially in the context of complex designs about which the
consumer may have limited expectations regarding the level of safety
required,188 this test adequately encapsulates how such a consumer would
conceive of the manufacturer's duty to the public. 189 Where, due to the nature of
the product, the ordinary consumer cannot form intelligible expectations of
safety, the consumer is entitled to expect that the manufacturer sought to ensure
that it placed the safest product reasonably practicable on the market.
Furthermore, even in cases that implicate only simple product designs and
where the consumer can form expectations about the product's safe function, the
consumer nonetheless reasonably expects that the manufacturer will engage in

backed away from it. See id. Regardless of the disappointing outcome of this test, the case is
instructive for its acknowledgement that consumers may reasonably have expectations about
manufacturer's conduct. See Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036; supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
183. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Wash. 1975).
184. See Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997); Tabert, 542
P.2d at 779-80; supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
185. Recall the contention in Phillips that the "seller-oriented standard and [the] user-oriented
standard" are really "two sides of the same standard." 525 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Welch v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982).
187. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 544, 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983)).
188. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
189. See OWEN, supra note 5, § 5.8, at 325 ("[A]t least in certain types of
cases,... consumers should be able to expect manufacturers to make their products as safe as
reasonably possible in view of the relevant costs and benefits."); Schwartz, supra note 27, at 479
(recognizing that in complex design cases, "while [the consumer] may have no specific expectations
for the product at all, he does generally trust that the product has been intelligently designed in light
of foreseeable contingencies with the consumer's safety in mind").
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the type of risk-utility balancing just described. No matter how familiar the
ordinary consumer is with the simplest product design, his awareness of dangers
posed by that product will never be as inclusive as the awareness of the
manufacturer responsible for its development. Thus, consumers are entitled to
expect that manufacturers are under a duty to perform this function in a
reasonable manner because consumers expect manufacturers to be aware of their
unique position to evaluate a product's safety. It is realistic to maintain that for
every product design, whether simple or complex, the ordinary consumer expects
that the manufacturer will weigh the costs and benefits that accompany the
design choices available for that product.
This type of expectation may be described as an expectation placed on the
manufacturer's conduct in accepting a certain design specification. Also to be
considered is an ordinary consumer's expectation regarding the functioning of a
particular product. It is not inconsistent to assert that consumers expect
manufacturers to exercise care in designing their products and that consumers
also expect certain products to function in certain ways with a particular level of
safety. This is the traditionally conceived consumer expectations test.1 The ALI
recognized the viability of this consideration as a factor in the risk-utility
balance in commentf to the Restatement Third by listing "the nature and strength
of consumer expectations regarding the product" among a list of factors to be
considered in evaluating an alternative design.191 Certainly the law should
require manufacturers to include an ordinary consumer's expectations regarding
a product's operation and safety high among the factors-perhaps as the
prominent factor-that weigh on design decision making. Any liability standard
seeking to remain consistent with South Carolina's legislative enactment of
section 402A must embrace this essential product design consideration.
The proposal described above presents a dual role for consumer expectations
in an attempt to stay true to the legislative adoption of the consumer expectations
test while recognizing that doctrine and practice have moved beyond a narrow
formulation of design defect liability. This solution preserves the consumer
expectations test in its traditional formulation, yet avoids an overzealous
application of the test to every design determination, by locating a consumer's
expectations regarding the functioning of a product in its proper position as one
of the crucial factors in deciding whether a design choice was reasonable. At the
same time, recognizing that consumers also possess expectations as to how a
manufacturer should discharge its design obligations allows for the insertion of
the traditional tort calculus to assess the manufacturer's conduct in meeting
consumer expectations. A liability standard so formulated soothes the discord
between the competing dictates in Claytor and Young 192 by defining consumer

190. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998).

192. See Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982); Young
v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)).
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expectations in risk-utility terms, and it remains within193
the statutory framework
that governs South Carolina design defect jurisprudence.
V.

CONCLUSION

South Carolina products liability law is governed by the legislature's
adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.194 Unfortunately,
as the decades have passed since the publication of this section, the courts and
commentators have come to realize that the unitary liability standard offered in
section 402A does not adequately address the myriad issues that may arise in a
products liability action. 195 This caused courts throughout the country to move
away from the consumer expectations •test
1 •toward
196 the more robust risk-utility
test when evaluating allegedly defective designs. Mirroring this national trend,
the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized the propriety of the risk-utility
test and announced that such balancing is relevant to assessing the expectations
of product consumers. 197 Coupled with the supreme court's failure to address its
198
prior holding that the consumer expectations test is determinative of liability,
the absence of a solid theoretical grounding for this new risk-utility standard has
caused other courts to struggle to elucidate a test that reserves a role for both
consumer expectations and risk-utility balancing. 199
A liability standard which recognizes that consumers have expectations as to
a manufacturer's conduct in designing products can ease the tension between
these two tests while remaining true to section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina
Code. Consumers are entitled to expect that a prudent manufacturer will assess
the relevant risks and utilities inherent in any product design before deciding to
market that product to the consuming public. Such a conception does no damage
to the traditional consumer expectations test but instead allows courts to consider
consumer expectations as a crucial yet competing factor in the nationally
preferred risk-utility test. South Carolina courts have already engaged in a riskutility analysis when assessing product designs; 2°° this proposal justifies that

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See S.C. Code Ann. §§15-73-10, -30 (2005).
See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
See supra Part ll.A-B.
See supra Part ll.B.
See Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978) (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i).

199. See Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing
Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132; Young, 270 S.C. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 680); Little v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480, 496 (D.S.C. 2001); Bragg v. Hi-Ranger,
Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 544, 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Reed, 697 F.2d at 1197;
Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132).
200. See Reed, 697 F.2d at 1197 (citing Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132; Young,
270 S.C. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 680); Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132; Bragg, 319 S.C. at
544, 462 S.E.2d at 328 (citing Reed, 697 F.2d at 1197; Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132).
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approach and offers transparency by explaining how such a test is derived from a
statute which bases liability on consumer expectations.
William L. Mills
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